Bryan R. Routledge / Carnegie Mellon University

	The Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background
	Bryan R. Routledge, Carnegie Mellon University
	In Peter Danielson (ed.), Modelling Rationality, Morality and Evolution, Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1998
	ABSTRACT Some of the game theoretic foundations of the prisoner's dilemma (pd) are presented. The brief survey covers the one-shot, finitely repeated and infinitely repeated versions of the game. The description of the one-shot game includes a discussion of the dominant strategy nature of the equilibrium and some of the common "solutions" to the dilemma. Equilibria in the finitely and infinitely repeated games are also presented including a discussion of folk theorem results and several modifications that allow cooperation in the finitely repeated version of the game.
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	Data updated: 08.01.2002 10:21

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